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RECENT DECISIONS
Insofar as everyone has the duty to refrain from negligent con-
duct resulting in injury to another, it seems that a business visitor,
negligent in pursuit of its business purpose resulting in injury to a
licensee, should not be immuned from liability solely because his in-
vitor is not liable to the party injured. It is now recognized law that
anyone conducting an activity upon the premises has the duty to use
reasonable care.' 3 Where a business visitor fails to use reasonable
care in the pursuit of its business purpose, it should be liable for any
injuries resulting from its negligence, sustained by one who had a
right to be on the premises.
JoHN A. FORMELLA
Labor Law - Conflict Between State and Federal Jurisdiction - Un-
der a directive issued by the National War Labor Board on February
20, 1945, the Plankinton Packing Company entered into a maintenance
of membership agreement with the Packing House Workers of Amer-
ica, C.I.O. Local #50. By the terms of this agreement, all employees
who were members of the Union on March 9, 1945, and all employees
who became members after that date, were required to maintain their
union membership as a condition of employment. On March 6, 1945,
William Stokes resigned from the Union. Immediately union officers
and men began a course of conduct intended to intimidate and to coerce
Stokes, and to bring about his discharge from the company. On May 9,
1945, this was accomplished and Stokes was released. A hearing was
held before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, and on De-
cember 6, 1946, an order was issued directing the Plankinton Company
to reinstate Stokes and to reimburse him for the amount of his lost
wages. On appeal to the Milwaukee Circuit Court this holding was re-
versed on the grounds that the W.E.R.B. was without jurisdiction. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court, and upheld the
jurisdiction of the W.E.R.B. Held: Reversed, per curiam decision.
Plankinton Packing Company v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, William Stokes, and Local #50, United Packing House Work-
ers of America, C.LO., 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950) .
This case presents another in a recent line of cases, many of which
have arisen in Wisconsin, involving the question of a conflict in juris-
diction between the state and federal governments under State Employ-
ment Relations Acts, the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor
og the property and either make it safe or warn him of its dangerous
condition."13Restatement of Torts, sec. 341, Prosser on Torts, p. 630.
'The judgment is reversed. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board,
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Management Relations Act of 1947. The Federal Government has,
of course, entered into the field of labor relations via the commerce
clause of the Constitution,2 and under the supremacy clause 3 any
federal legislation on a particular matter must, of necessity, replace
state law. The problem thus presents itself: an industry engaged in
interstate commerce, and an alleged violation of a State Labor Relations
Act, is that alleged violation regulated by federal law, so as to deny a
state employment relations board, jurisdiction over the matter?
In the Bethlehem Steel case,4 cited in the per curiam decision of the
principal case, the facts were relatively simple. The National Labor
Relations Board, which had asserted a general jurisdiction over fore-
men unions, refused to certify those unions as collective bargaining
agents. A subsequent certification by the state board under New York
law was held invalid. The United States Supreme Court stated:
"The State argues for a rule that would enable it to act
until the Federal Board had acted in the same case, but we do
not think that a case-by-case test of Federal supremacy is per-
missible here. The Federal Board has jurisdiction of the indus-
try in which these particular employers are engaged and has
asserted control of their labor relations in general. It asserts,
and rightfully so. . . (its power to decide the issue involved.)
We do not believe this leaves room for the operation of the state
authority asserted."5
The LaCrosse Telephone case,- also cited in the per curiam decision
of the principal case, arose in Wisconsin, and was similar in its factual
situation to the Bethlehem case. One union sought to replace another
as the collective bargaining agent. The W.E.R.B. conducted an election,
and certified the new union as the representative. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that the state could exercise its jurisdiction in such
matters until the Federal Board had acted, but the United States Su-
preme Court reversed this holding, citing the Bethlehem case, and
emphasizing the supremacy of the Federal Board, even though that
board had not acted on the question presented.
7
330 U.S. 767; LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 18.
2 U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8, Cl. 3.
3 U.S. Const. Art. 6.
4Bethlehem Steel Company v. New York State Labor Relations Board, supra,
note 1.
5 Ibid., at p. 776.
6 LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra,
note 1.
7 Ibid., at p. 25. "Since the employers in question (referring to the Bethlehem
Steel Co. case) were subject to regulation by the National Board, we thought
the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intrusion of the
state agency, even though the National Board had not acted in the particular
cases before us .. .Those considerations control the present zase."
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The above two cases leave little doubt as to the supremacy of the
federal law. The particular problem involved, of course, was the cer-
tification of unions, and since there was a federal law, regulating such
matters, any state law9 was invalid.
Another section of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Act'0 was
considered in relation to the Labor Management Relations Act, in In-
ternational Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (referred
to as the Briggs-Straton case.) 1 In that case the Wisconsin Board had
ordered the union to cease and desist from instigating certain inter-
mittant and unannounced work stoppages, holding them to be unfair
labor practices under Wisconsin Law. The United States Supreme
Court used a rather fine distinction in upholding the jurisdiction of
the W.E.R.B., deciding that the federal lawa2 was concerned with
'objectives' and not 'methods', and that hence state regulation was
permissible."
3
In the principal case another clause of the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Act must be considered in relation to the National Act. The
Wisconsin State Law, in section 111.06 provides:
1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce his employes in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 111.04 (right
to self-organization, etc.)...
c) To encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization, employe agency, committee, association or
representation plan by discrimination in regard to hiring,
tenure of other terms or conditions of employment: (pro-
viding that an all-union contract may be made under cer-
tain conditions).
The Federal Law, in Section 8 of the Wagner Act, Title 29, U.S.
Code Section 158 provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer:
1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employes in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. (Section 7 relates to
the right of self-organization, etc.)
3) By discrimination in regard to hire on tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
829 U.S.C. 159b, National Labor Relations Act.
9 Wis. Stats. 111.02(6), 111.05.
1OWis. Stats. 111.06 (2) (a) (e) (h).
1336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949).
129 U.S.C. 158(b) (4), Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
13 Supra, note 13 at p. 253. "While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a
strike, when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal,
it has been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal-even
if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons or
destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the states."
1951]
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courage membership in any labor organization; provided
(that nothing in this act shall prevent an employer from en-
tering into a closed shop agreement with the representatives
of the employees.)
Perhaps the closest case to the principal case, as far as the facts
are concerned, is the Algoma Plywood case.14 In 1943, under pressure
of the War Labor Board, the Algoma Plywood Company agreed to a
maintenance of membership clause in its contract with Local #1521.
In 1947, Victor Moreau was discharged from his employment for non-
payment of union dues. He brought an action under section 111.06
(1) (c) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which prohibits an all union shop
unless two-thirds of the workers agree to it. There had been no such
agreement in the Algoma case. The Wisconsin Board ordered the
maintenance of membership clause striken from the contract, and re-
quired that Moreau be reinstated. The defendant denied the jurisdic-
tion of the Wisconsin Board on the ground that the National Board
had exclusive authority under 10a of the National Labor Relations
Act,'1 5 and on the grounds that the Wisconsin Statute, section 111.06
(1) (c) was repugnant to section 158(3) of the National Act. In short
it was argued that the state cannot forbid what section 158(3) affirma-
tively permits, and that since that section permits a union shop, a state
act cannot prohibit it. The court, however, examined the purposes of
section 158(3), and concluded that it did not deprive the states of their
power to regulate union and closed shops. 6 Thus the Wisconsin Board
was allowed to exercise its jurisdiction where under state law, a union
shop is illegal if entered into without an election among the employees.1T
Following the Algoma case, it might appear that the principal case
holds just the opposite. There is, however, a fundamental distinction
between the two cases. In the Algoma case, Victor Moreau was dis-
charged for failing to pay his union dues. Such a discharge constituted
an unfair labor practice under Wisconsin Law where there had been
no election to determine whether a union shop was desired. In the
principal case, the problem of a union shop never arose, since Stokes
was NOT discharged under a union shop agreement. Under the con-
14 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584 (1949).15 29 U.S.C. 160(a).
'
8 Supra, note 14 at p. 308, quoting S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 11-12.
the bill does nothing to facilitate closed shop agreements or to make
them legal in a state where they are illegal. It does not interfere with the
status quo, but leaves the way open to such agreements as might now be legally
consumated."
1 Under the new Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, a similar conclusion
would be reached. While section 8(3) of that Act forbids the closed shop
and strictly regulates the conditions under which union shop agreements may
be entered, section 14(b) was included to forestall the inference that the
federal policy was to be exclusive.
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tract he had a period of about fifteen days within which he could
legally withdraw from the union. When he exercised this option, pres-
sure was placed upon the Company to fire him. It was this pressure
which constituted the unfair labor practice under section 158(3) of the
Federal Act,"' and which in turn gave the Federal Board jurisdiction
of the case.
Prior to the decision in the principal case, the conflict between state
and federal jurisdiction in the matter of union certification had been
clearly resolved. While it is perhaps unfortunate that this case was
dismissed with a terse per curiam decision, nevertheless it cannot be
said to be in conflict with previous decisions. The Algoma case had left
'open' to state regulation, those fields of unfair labor practices not in-
tended to be covered by the Federal Law. The principal case simply
limits in one more instance those so-called 'open' fields. While the new
Labor-Management Relations Act does contain a provision allowing
the Federal Board to cede its jurisdiction to State Boards under cer-
tain circumstances, the tendency of the courts today, plus the rather
complete condification of the new Act, indicates that federal jurisdic-
tion will be upheld whenever possible.
RICHAARD P. BUELLESBACH
Evidence - Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Show a Written Con-
tract to Be a Sham-The plaintiff contractor alleged that the defendant
made an oral agreement with him whereby he was to construct a house
for the defendant's daughter and son-in-law on a cost plus basis. Later
the plaintiff was induced to enter into a written contract with the
daughter and son-in-law for the specified consideration of $12,500, with
the understanding, however, that the written agreement would not be
binding; it was only to keep th defendant's brother from learning
the cost of the house or for whom it was to be built. The defandant
denied that an oral agreement existed, contending that the written
agreement embodied the complete contract except that he had orally
agreed to pay the plaintiff an additional $2,500 as a gratuity to indilce
completion of the building. The plaintiff sued for the difference be-
tween the ambunt the defendant had paid and the consideration spe--
cified in the oral contract. Held: Parol evidence was admissible to.
show that the written contract was to be of no binding force and was.
entered into only as a sham. Mardon et. al. v. Ferris, 43 N.W. (2d) 904"
(Mich., 1950).
1s 29 U.S.C. 158(3) "By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization.. !'
